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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA LOIS COOPER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent; 
VS 
FORESTERS UNDER-
WRITERS, INC., a 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7941 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action on an insurance policy issued 
by the Appellant to Respondent on March 31, 1951, 
which provides for certain medical, surgical and hos-
pital benefits described in the policy (see Exhibit 
attached to Complaint, Tr. 2). The case was heard 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, at which time 
the following statement of facts was agreed to: 
"The Plaintiff made application, paid her 
first premium of six dollars, and was insured 
by defendant on March 31, 1951. Monthly pay-
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ments of six dollars each were paid during each 
of the months of May, June, July and August, 
1951. Payment of six dollars was made on Octo-
ber 1, 1951. The accident occurred in the after-
noon of October 31, 1951, and in the evening of 
October 31, 1951, after the accident occurred 
and after Defendant's office was closed, the 
payment of twelve dollars was.made to an agent 
of the Defendant at the home of the agent." 
(Tr. 10 and 11.) 
Based upon the foregoing the trial court granted 
the motion of Respondent for summary judgment, 
apparently upon the theory that the grace period 
provided for in the policy did not expire until mid-
night of the day of the accident and the policy was 
therefore in full force and effect at the time of the 
accident. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE POLICY HAD LAPSED, ACCORD-
ING TO ITS TERMS, AT THE TIME OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
II 
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED AT NOON 
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951. 
III 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 3 IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point No. III will not be argued separately, but 
is included in the discussion under Points No. I and 
II. 
I 
THE POLICY HAD LAPSED ACCORDING 
TO ITS TERMS AT THE TIM-E OF THE ACCI-
DENT. 
The policy contains the following provisions 
(See Exhibit attached to Complaint, Tr. 2): 
"This Certificate is dated and takes effect 
March 31, 1951, in consideration of the state-
ments and agreements made by the insured in 
the application and the payment in advance of 
$6.00 as the first premium, which maintains 
this Certificate in force for one month from 
its effective date. The payment in advance and 
acceptance by the Company of p rem i u m s 
monthly of $6.00 thereafter is required to keep 
this Certificate in continuous effect. The Com-
pany's acceptance of the premiums will consti-
tute its consent for renewal. All periods of in-
surance hereunder shall begin and end at twelve 
o'clock noon, standard time, at the residence of 
the insured. 
"SECTION V. GRACE PERIOD. A grace 
period of thirty-one (31) days will be allowed 
for payment of any renewal premium during 
which grace period the Certificate will remain 
in full force." 
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"SECTION VII. (3) No statement made 
by the applicant for insurance not included 
herein shall void the certificate or be used in 
any legal proceeding hereunder. No agent has 
authority to change this Certificate or to waive 
any of its provisions. No change in this Certifi-
cate shall be valid unless approved by an execu-
tive officer of the organization and such ap-
proval be endorsed hereon." _ 
" ( 4) If default be made in the payment of 
the agreed premium for this Certificate, the 
·subsequent acceptance of a premium by the Or-
ganization or by any of its duly authorized 
agents shall reinstate the Certificate, but only 
to cover accidental injury thereafter sustained 
and such sickness as may begin more than ten 
days after the date of such acceptance." 
The policy provides for monthly "periods of in-
surance" which begin and end at noon on the last day 
of each month, commencing March 31, 1951, andre-
quired the payment of a monthly permium of $6.00 to 
keep the "certificate in continuous effect." The first 
premium paid the policy to April 30, 1951, at noon, 
and the premiums paid during the months of May, 
June, July and August paid the policy to noon of the 
last day of each of those months. The payment made 
on October 1st was made on the last day of the grace 
period and paid the policy to noon of September 30, 
1951. The last "period of insurance" was from noon 
September 30 to noon October 31. October having 
31 days, the grace period corresponded with the 
"period of insurance" and expired on October 31, 
1951. The premium for this "period of insurance" 
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was not paid during the grace period, therefore the 
policy had lapsed at the time the accident occurred 
in the afternoon of October 31, 1951. The payment 
made in the evening of October 31st does not alter the 
result for the reason that Section VII ( 4) of the poli-
cy provides for reinstatement "only to cover acci-
dental injury thereafter sustained." 
II 
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED AT NOON 
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951. 
The trial court apparently took the position that 
the law does not recognize fractions of days and that 
the grace period ran until midnight October 31, 
1951. That the law does not take cognizance of frac-
tions of days as a general rule is recognized. We 
are also aware of Section 68-3-7 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
"68-3-7. TIME, HOW COMPUTED.-The 
time in which any act provided by law is to be 
done is computed by excluding the first day and 
including the last, unless the last is a holiday, 
and then it also is excluded." 
But the rule adopted by the trial court is a mere 
legal fiction and subject to limitations as stated in 
52 American Jurisprudence, Pages 340 an~ 341, as 
follows: 
"The general rule that the law knows no 
fractions of a day is a mere legal fiction, and, 
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like all other legal fictions, is allowed to operate 
only in cases where it will promote right and 
justice. 
"And although the ends of justice never re-
quire that the law depart from the ordinary 
rule and recognize a fraction of a day to defeat 
the manifest intention of the parties, where the 
parties to a contract stipulate for the perform-
ance of the contract by an agreed hour on a 
certain day, the law in such case will take cogni-
zance of the fractions of the day." 
Perhaps the most common exception to the 
above general rule in the field of insurance is found 
in cases where the policy expires at a certain time 
of day, such as in Mutual Benefit Health and Acci-
dent, vs. Kennedy, 140 Fed. 2d 24, where the policy 
expired at noon on a certain day and it was held that 
where the insured drowned two hours thereafter 
there was no coverage. The same proposition is 
found in Shankle, vs. Home Insurance Company of 
New York, 133 S. W. 2d 289 (Tenn.) where the 
policy provided for coverage from December 5, 1936, 
to December 5, 1937, at Noon Standard Time, place 
of issue, and it was held that an accident which oc-
curred at 7:30 p.m. on December 5, 1937, was not 
covered. The Court in the Shankle case observed that 
the principle that the law knows no part of a day 
has no application to a contract having a definite 
hour for its expiration. 
In the case at bar not only the hour of begin-
ning, but also the hour of ending each ''period of 
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insurance" is specifically set forth. There is no am-
biguity in the wording of the provisions. Likewise, 
the case at bar should be distinguished from one 
where the policy provides for a definite hour of com-
mencement on a certain day, but fails to specify a 
definite hour of termination. The question for de-
cision is whether the time specified in the policy as 
to the beginning and ending of the uperiod of in-
surance" applies to the grace period, the grace period 
not having such a specification. The wording of the 
grace period provision is: 
"A grace period of thirty-one (31) days will 
be allowed . . . " 
The trial court held that the grace period ex-
pired at midnight on October 31, 1951. This does 
violence to the policy in that it allows 31Yz days of 
grace instead of 31 as provided for therein. The 
interpretation of Appellant is the only one consistent 
with the terms of the policy. 
There are a number of cases which have specifi-
cally held that the grace period, renewal period, etc., 
although not specifically limited as to hour, are lim-
ited by the other provisions of the policy. In the case 
of Richardson, vs. American National Insurance 
Company, 137 S. 370 (La.) the following are the 
pertinent provisions of the policy: 
"In co11sideration of the ... payment in ad-
vance of a policy fee of Two Dollars and a pre-
mium of $1.95 does hereby insure Thomas Rich-
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ardson, subject to all the conditions herein 
contained and endorsed hereon, from 12:00 
o'clock noon, standard time, of the day this con-
tract is dated, until12 :00 o'clock noon, standard 
time, of the 15th day of February, 1925, and 
for such further periods, stated in the renewal 
receipts, as the payment of the premium speci-
fied in said application will maintain this policy 
and insurance in force, against death or dis-
b.l·t " a 1 1 y ... 
" ( 2) A period of five ( 5) days of grace is 
allowed for the payment of any renewal prem-
ium, during which the policy shall be main-
tained in full force and effect in accordance 
with .its terms, but if the payment of any re-
newal premium is made after the grace period 
of the policy has expired neither the Insured nor 
the Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover for 
any accidental injury sustained between the 
date of such expiration and 12:00 o'clock noon, 
standard time, of the day following the date of 
such renewal payment; or for any illness origin-
ating or death occurring before the expiration 
of ten (10) days after the date of such renewal 
payment. 
" ( 3) If default be made in the payment of 
the agreed premium for this policy, the subse-
quent acceptance of a premium by the Company 
or by any of its duly authorized agents shall 
reinstate the Policy, but only to cover accidental 
injury thereafter sustained and such sickness 
as may begin more than ten days after the date 
of such acceptance." 
The premium due at noon on February 15, 1929, 
was not paid until February 22, 1929. The insured 
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was fatally shot on February 20, 1929, at 4:45 p.m. 
It was contended that inasmuch as the grace period 
provision was not limited to noon that the insured 
had until six p.m., or sunset of the last day to pay 
the premium in accordance with a provision of the 
Louisiana law. The Court held that the grace period 
expired at noon of the last day. The language of the 
Court is as follows : 
"We conclude that, under both the common 
law and the codal article, contracting parties 
have the right to stipulate for the performance 
of the con tract by an agreed hour on a certain 
day and the law in such case will take cogni-
zance of the fractions of the day. 
"The argument of plaintiff's attorney is 
predicated upon only a few words of the clauses 
in question, which he attempts to isolate from 
the language of the balance of the clause and 
the other clauses in the policy. To accept this 
interpretation would be to give the plaintiff not 
only five days' grace, but five days, four hours, 
and forty-five minutes. We do not believe that 
this was contemplated by the parties and that 
the language in question must be interpreted 
in connection with the remainder of the clause 
and also the other provisions of the policy~ 
which, as a whole, show that the policy com-
menced and ended at 12 o'clock noon, whether 
it was terminated upon the expiration of the 
term or tlpon the termination of a renewal per-
iod, or upon the termination of the grace period. 
All of the periods of time in the policy are based 
upon 12 o'clock noon. We find no uncertainty 
or ambiguity or conject11re in the language of 
the policy on this point." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Orlando, vs. Rosen, 290 N. Y. S. 270. This case 
involved a workmen's compensation policy which was 
written to expire on November 11, 1934, at 12:01 
a.m. By a rider attached, the policy was extended 
for a period of one month to expire on December 11, 
1934. The rider contains the following provision: 
"Subject otherwise to all terms, limitations and con-
ditions of the policy to which this endorsement is 
attached." The claimant was injured at two p.m. on 
December 11, 1934. It was held that the policy had 
expired some hours earlier that day. 
Purvis, vs. Commercial Casualty Co., 159 S. E. 
369 (S.C.) (1931). The defendant insured Jack W. 
Purvis "for the term of twelve months from the 3rd 
day of September, 1928, from Noon Standard Time" 
against loss or disability or death from accidental 
means. On September 3, 1929, about five o'clock in 
the afternoon Purvis was fatally injured. The Court 
held that the policy had lapsed at the time of the in-
jury and stated as follows: 
"In the case at bar, the parties stipulated in 
the contract, as was their right, that the in-
surance should be for a term of twelve months, 
beginning at noon of September 3, 1928; in view 
of the fact that the insured was fatally injured 
a few hours after noon of September 3, 1929, 
it would be an injustice to the insurer for the 
court to hold, nothing else appearing, that the 
insurance was in force during the whole of that 
day." 
The Plaintiff contended that a receipt book is-
sued by the company contained a notation that the 
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premium must be paid on or before September 3, 
1929, and that by reason of there being no limita-
tions as to time of day when the premium should be 
paid that the insured had the entire day to make 
payment thereof. In discussing this point, however, 
the Court said: 
"The receipt book contains notice that such 
· premium must be paid on or before Setpember 
3, 1929. The policy indicates that it was the 
clear intent of the parties that the insurance 
should expire at 12 o'clock noon September 3, 
1929. There is nothing in the receipt book to 
indicate a contrary intention; the notice that 
the renewal premium must be p.aid on or before 
September 3, 1929, merely meaning, in con-
nection with the provisions of the policy, that, 
jf payment should be deferred until that date, 
it must be made by 12 o'clock noon. It being 
conceded that the renewal premium was not 
paid by or before 12 o'clock noon of September 
3, and that the insured received his injuries 
some hours thereafter, it is clear that the policy 
was not in force at the time of the fatal acci-
dent.'' 
In the case of Troy Automobile Exchange, vs. 
Home Insurance Company, 103 Misc. Rep. 331, 169 
N.Y. S. 796,. 798, the policy ran from one date certain 
at noon to another date certain at noon. The period 
covered by a renewal certificate which ran from the 
30th of one month to the 30th of another was in-
volved. In the Troy case the insurance company tried 
to avoid liability for loss of a car that was stolen 
on August 30, 1913, on the theory that August 30th 
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was excluded by the renewal certificate. The Court, 
however, held that the period of renewal ran from 
noon on August 30th to noon on September 30th: 
"The defendant, however, insists that the in-
surance kept in force by certificate No. 10 runs 
from August 30, to September 30, 1931, and 
therefore, admitting the date of the theft to be 
August 30th, it is not included within the term 
of the contract, because the word 'from' would 
not include August 30th, or any part thereof, 
but would begin the next day; but the certificate 
must be construed in the light of the policy 
under which it was issued, and, reading both 
together as we must, it is clear that the insur-
ance was from noon of the 30th of August to 
noon of the 30th of September." 
Our search has not revealed a U tab case exactly 
in point on the facts. However, Fawcett, vs. Security 
Benefit Association, 99 Utah 193, 104 Pac. 2d 214, 
218, is a case involving the construction of an insur-
ance contract and the principle of construction there-
in adopted is determinative of the question involved 
in the case at bar. The language of the Court is: 
"Since such provision of the certificate is not 
so clear as to be susceptible of but one con-
struction, we must determine which of the per-
missible interpretations thereof is consistent 
with the other provisions of the entire agree-
ment. Even though a particular provision of a 
contract of insurance be susceptible of more 
than one meaning, the construction of such pro-
vision more favorable to the assured will not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
be adopted if other provisions of the entire con-
tract clearly resolve the ambiguity in favor of 
the contrary construction." 
There is no ambiguity in the contract in the case 
at bar. The t:rial court went beyond and outside the 
contract and adopted a legal fiction contrary to its 
terms. The contract can not be rendered ambiguous 
by a strained misapplication of a legal fiction. In 
the Fawcett case, where the contract itself was sus-
ceptible of more than one meaning, this Court adopt-
ed the interpretation consistent with the other pro-
visions of the entire contract. In the case at bar, 
where an alternative interpretation is made possible 
only by a legal fiction, this Court is bound to follow 
the holding in the Fawcett case and adopt the inter-
pretation which is consistent with the entire provis-
ions of the contract. 
The judgment of the trial court should be re-
versed and the Complaint dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-- .. -.................... ·--.... -- ...... --- ..... -....... -.----.... -.............. --.. --..... ---·- .. 
OF ROMNEY AND BOYER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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